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EUROPEAN POPULATIONS are characterized by an increasing share of immi-
grants and their descendants (Castles and Miller 2009; Rees et al. 2012).
In the second half of the twentieth century, most immigrants arrived in
Northern and Western European countries, whereas in the first decade of
this century Southern European countries experienced a rapid increase of
the immigrant population (Arango 2000; Cornelius 1994; Raymer, de Beer,
and van der Erf 2011). Central and Eastern European countries with state
socialist regimes and planned economies showed specific migration pat-
terns during the post–World War II period; some countries contributed to
intra-European labor migration, others experienced emigration of political
refugees. The East–West migration streams significantly increased after the
fall of Communism, and some Eastern European countries have experi-
enced large emigration streams also in the first decades of the twenty-first
century (Fassmann and Münz 1994; Frejka 1996; Raymer, de Beer, and
van der Erf 2011; Rees et al. 2012). Over time, the share of the descendants
of postwar immigrants has also increased (we also refer to them as ethnic
minorities or the second generation). In many Northern andWestern Euro-
pean countries, immigrants and their descendants form approximately one-
fifth to one-fourth of the population (OECD 2014; Zimmermann 2005).
Immigrants and their descendants thus increasingly shape demographic, so-
cial, and cultural trends in European societies.
There is extensive research on different aspects of immigrants’ lives,
including their legal status and citizenship (Bauböck 2003; Seifert 1997),
employment and education (Adsera and Chiswick 2007; Rendall et al.
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2010), and residential and housing patterns (Arbaci 2008; Musterd 2005).
There is also a growing interest in family and fertility dynamics among
ethnic minorities. While the fertility of immigrants in European countries
has received considerable attention in the recent demographic literature
(Andersson 2004; Kulu and Milewski 2007; Milewski 2010b; Mussino and
Strozza 2012; Sobotka 2008; Tromans, Natamba, and Jefferie 2009), the
childbearing patterns among the descendants of immigrants have been little
studied and understood. The few existing studies show that the descendants
of immigrants fromhigh-fertility countries usually have lower fertility levels
than their parents’ generation, but fertility levels for some groups remain
high relative to the fertility of the host population (Coleman and Dubuc
2010; Dubuc 2012; Milewski 2010b; Sobotka 2008).
The present study investigates the childbearing patterns among the
descendants of immigrants in six European countries: the UK, France,
Germany, Belgium, Sweden, and Spain. This group includes “old” and
“new” immigrant countries as well as countries with different migration
and family policies and fertility dynamics and patterns. The cross-country
analysis of fertility behavior among ethnic minorities allows us to detect
similarities and differences across European countries. Our main focus is on
the fertility of the descendants of immigrants from high-fertility countries.
We examine whether the fertility patterns of the second generation are sim-
ilar to those of their parents’ generation, which are often shaped by fertility
patterns in the sending country, or those of the native population (defined
here as native-born persons with native-born parents). Our study is the first
to analyze ethnic minority fertility by parity, with and without controls for
demographic and socioeconomic factors.
Explaining fertility among the descendants
of immigrants
Previous research has investigated the role of origin and destination coun-
try contexts in shaping immigrant fertility. Some studies have demonstrated
that immigrants maintain the childbearing patterns dominant in their coun-
try of origin (Coleman 1994; Garssen and Nicolaas 2008), whereas oth-
ers have shown that, over time, immigrant fertility behavior increasingly
resembles that of natives in the destination country (Andersson 2004).
However, immigrants moving from high-fertility to low-fertility countries
tend to have larger families than the natives in the destination country
(Milewski 2010b). As a result of selection processes, the fertility behavior
of immigrants can also differ substantially from the behavior dominant in
the sending country (Chiswick 1999; González-Ferrer, Hannemann, and
Castro-Martín 2016). The fertility behavior of the descendants of immi-
grants is primarily influenced by the social environment in the country in
which they grew up, although that environment is not uniform. Some may
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grow up under the influence of mainstream society, while others may be
raised and live largely under the influence of a minority subculture, if such
a subculture exists.
The influence of mainstream society leads to structural (mainly eco-
nomic) and cultural assimilation of the descendants of immigrants, suggest-
ing that their behavior becomes similar to that of the majority population
(Berry 1992). The existence of a minority subculture indicates that popula-
tions of immigrant background may preserve values, norms, and attitudes
toward family and fertility that are common in their countries of origin
(Milewski 2010b). Over time a group of immigrants and their descendants
may gradually become a minority group with a sense of self-awareness to
distinguish between “us” and “them,” a distinction that is also perceived by
members of the majority group (Bean and Tienda 1987; Milewski 2010a).
Research should therefore determine whether the childbearing be-
havior of the descendants of immigrants from high-fertility societies more
closely resembles that of their parents (and their country of origin) or the
behavior that dominates in the mainstream society. If immigrants and their
descendants exhibit similar fertility behavior, and that behavior differs sig-
nificantly from the behavior of the native population, we could assume that
the descendants of immigrants were mostly raised under the influence of
the minority subculture (Kulu and González-Ferrer 2014). In contrast, if
we observe similar patterns for the descendants of immigrants and the na-
tives, we can conclude that the descendants of immigrants havemostly been
influenced by the mainstream society (ibid.). If both the minority subcul-
ture andmainstream society played an important role (potentially at various
stages in an individual’s life, e.g., the minority subculture at earlier ages and
the mainstream society later), the second generation should show fertility
levels that are in between those of immigrants and natives. Such a compar-
ison assumes some differences in fertility levels between the two reference
groups, which may be true for immigrants from high-fertility countries now
living in low-fertility settings (e.g., Turkish immigrants in Germany), but
not for those who have moved between two countries with similar fertility
levels (e.g., Romanians in Spain), although a detailed analysis of childbear-
ing patterns may still reveal some important differences between the groups
(e.g., the timing of family formation).
What factors explain the fertility patterns among the descendants of
immigrants? Cultural factors are likely to be important. Relatively high
fertility levels among some ethnic minority groups may be explained by
the fact that they come from large families; they may have grown up in a
high-fertility culture and extended family may play an important role in
their lives (Fernández and Fogli 2006; Penn and Lambert 2002; Robson
and Berthoud 2006). Extended family can support young mothers with
children, particularly by providing high-quality and cheap childcare when
needed. Furthermore, the value and societal meaning of children may
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vary between countries and ethnic origins, which would explain some
differences in fertility behavior among various ethnic groups (Nauck 2007;
Nauck and Klaus 2007). Besides the value of children, the intensity and
strength of family ties and the impact of kin on fertility decisions may vary
between cultures (Reher 1998). Larger families could also be a result of the
cultural pressure to continue childbearing until couples have at least one
and preferably two sons (Hampshire, Blell, and Simpson 2012). Similarly,
normative factors may be responsible for a desire for small families among
the descendants of immigrants who grew up under the influence of a
low-fertility mainstream society.
While most research on immigrant and ethnic minority fertility
tends to emphasize the importance of cultural factors, education and
employment-related factors may play a key role in shaping the fertility be-
havior of the descendants of immigrants. Successful structural integration
suggests that high educational aspirations and increased opportunity costs
of childbearing may lead to a lengthy postponement of family formation
and smaller family size among ethnic minority women, thus following the
trends for natives in European countries. In contrast, poor employment
prospects among some ethnic minority groups due to inferior education
and discrimination in the labor market may promote early onset and high
completed fertility. Young ethnic minority women may decide to choose
the motherhood track to find meaning for their lives and justify their lives
to others. For example, research in the UK shows that women of Pakistani
and Bangladeshi ethnic origin equate being a housewife and mother with
high status (Salway 2007). While such a belief may be consistent with
traditional gender roles in South Asian communities (Hennink, Diamond,
and Cooper 1999), it could equally be explained by the poor employment
options among ethnic minority women.
Welfare state benefits and policies have been shown to shape fertility
trends and patterns in Europe and other industrialized countries (Hoem
1993b; Luci-Greulich and Thevenon 2013; McDonald 2006; Neyer and
Andersson 2008). State policies may influence the fertility behavior of mi-
grants as well (Andersson and Scott 2005). In addition, as with the native
population, the descendants of migrants are influenced by the state welfare
policies in their home country from early childhood. Thus, state policies
may explain whether and how much convergence toward the native base-
line has taken place among the descendants of immigrants. The effect of the
mainstream society on the descendants of immigrants can be assumed to
be stronger in countries with inclusive integration policies and policies that
reduce inequalities between population subgroups and promote equality
in all spheres of society (including gender equality) than in countries with
exclusionist integration policies or where market forces are expected to
dominate individuals’ lives (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen and
Billari 2015; McDonald 2000; Seifert 1997). Thus, the existence of state
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policies or the lack of them may explain high fertility rates among some
ethnic minority women. For example, high residential segregation (with
the weakest schools being located in ethnic minority areas) or selective
school systems (where selection takes place at an early age, leaving little
chance for minority children to excel) may lead to poor educational attain-
ment among ethnic minority populations. Ethnic minority women with
poor employment prospects may decide on the motherhood track, particu-
larly if family policies encourage women to stay at home with children. In
contrast, low educational segregation between population subgroups and
state policies that encourage women’s employment and support the com-
patibility of employment and parenthood, in turn, may explain low fertility
among ethnic groups in a country (Kulu and González-Ferrer 2014).
Recent research has emphasized the importance of gender equality in
shaping fertility trends and patterns in Europe, showing that more equal-
itarian countries have higher fertility levels than less equalitarian societies
in the low-fertility context (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Kohler,
Billari, and Ortega 2002; McDonald 2000). The interplay between gender-
related attitudes among ethnic minority women and the levels of gender
equality within minority groups may significantly shape minority fertility.
The conventional male-breadwinner model may promote relatively high
fertility levels among ethnic minority women with conservative gender
roles. However, in groups with conservative gender relations but high
aspirations for gender equality among ethnic minority women, fertility
levels may be low, especially in countries where compatibility between
employment and parenthood is difficult to achieve (McDonald 2000).
Childbearing among the descendants
of immigrants in Europe
Previous research has shown that the descendants of some immigrants
have fertility levels that are similar to those of the native population, but
there are also ethnic minorities, predominantly those of non-Western
origin, with early childbearing and relatively high completed fertility levels
(Sobotka 2008). Milewski (2010b) analyzed fertility of the second gen-
eration in Germany and showed that there were few (if any) differences
between the childbearing behavior of the descendants of immigrants from
Southern Europe and native Germans, whereas those of Turkish descent
exhibited distinct childbearing patterns. Immigrants of Turkish descent
had their first child much earlier than other population groups, and the
likelihood of having a first and a third child was much higher than among
the native population. Scott and Stanfors (2011), investigating the fertility
levels of ethnic minorities in Sweden, showed that the descendants of
immigrants in general had lower first birth rates than the native Swedish
population. Only a limited number of groups of descendants from a few
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high-fertility countries had higher first birth rates than the native Swedish
population or other ethnic minority groups.
A study by Coleman and Dubuc (2010) showed that fertility levels
declined significantly among ethnic minority populations in Britain in the
last decades of the twentieth century. For each ethnic group, fertility levels
were lower among the descendants of immigrants than among immigrants.
However, fertility levels were low among women of Indian and Caribbean
origin, but still relatively high among women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi
descent. Garssen and Nicolaas (2008) found similar results in their study
of the childbearing patterns of women of Turkish and Moroccan origin in
the Netherlands. They showed that immigrant women had significantly
higher fertility levels than the native Dutch population, while the second
generation exhibited fertility levels that were in between of those of im-
migrants and natives. Milewski (2011), analyzing the family formation of
women of Turkish descent in seven European countries, showed that they
had high levels in all seven countries. However, there were also significant
differences across countries: second-generation Turkish women had higher
rates in Sweden, France, and the Netherlands and lower levels in Germany
and Switzerland. Thus, the study provided evidence of both socialization
into a minority subculture and assimilation within the mainstream society.
This study examines childbearing patterns among the descendants
of immigrants in selected European countries, with a particular focus on
ethnic minority women whose parents arrived from high-fertility coun-
tries. Our hypotheses derive from previous research, which was briefly
discussed above. First, most ethnic minority groups in Europe will exhibit
childbearing patterns similar to those of the respective native populations,
but fertility levels are expected to remain relatively high among certain
ethnic minority women, mostly those of non-Western origin. It is less clear
whether their expected high fertility is attributed to the higher likelihoods
of all three parity transitions or mostly to high levels of third births. Sec-
ond, we expect fertility differences between natives, immigrants, and their
descendants to decrease after adjusting for women’s sociodemographic
characteristics; again, an interesting question is the extent to which edu-
cation explains initial fertility differences across the population subgroups.
Finally, we expect to observe smaller variation in ethnic minority fertility
in countries that have social policies to reduce inequalities and differences
between population subgroups.
Data
Data for the UK are from the first wave (2009/2010) of the Understand-
ing Society study, which collected retrospective information on the part-
nership and fertility histories of the British population, including a sample
for themain ethnic groups (University of Essex 2015; Kulu and Hannemann
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2016). For France, data from two sources were combined: the Trajectories
and Origins survey, conducted in 2007 by the French National Institute
of Demography and the French National Statistical Office; and the Fam-
ily and Housing Survey, another retrospective study that was carried out
by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies in 2011 (Pailhé
2015). The German data come from the micro-census of 2005 and 2009,
a one percent sample of all German households. The fertility histories of
German women were reconstructed using the own-children method (Cho,
Retherford, and Choe 1986; Krapf and Wolf 2015). For Belgium, we use
2001 census data, which contain information on women’s full fertility his-
tories. The Swedish data are derived from the Swedish Population Register,
which includes information on all main life events of individuals, including
the birth of children (Andersson and Persson 2015). Finally, for Spain, we
use data from the Fertility and Values Survey, which was conducted by the
Centre for Sociological Research in 2006 (González-Ferrer, Castro-Martín,
and Kraus 2015).
We investigate fertility by parity among the descendants of immigrants
in these six countries. In total, there are asmany as 40 population subgroups
for the analysis of first births. For some countries, groups of natives, immi-
grants (the first generation), and their descendants (the second generation)
are included, while for other countries data are available only for natives
and the descendants of immigrants. The UK data distinguish among four
groups of origin for both immigrant generations: 1) Europe and other indus-
trialized countries; 2) India; 3) Pakistan and Bangladesh; and 4) Caribbean
countries. For France, the following groups of immigrants and their descen-
dants are investigated: 1) Maghreb states; 2) sub-Saharan Africa; 3) Turkey;
and 4) Southern Europe. The German data include only one ethnic minor-
ity group: women of Turkish descent. The main groups of origin for ethnic
minorities in Belgium are: 1) Italy; 2) Morocco; and 3) Turkey. The data
on the minority populations of Sweden consist of the descendants of immi-
grants from: 1) Finland; 2) former Yugoslavia; 3) Turkey; and 4) Iran. For
Spain, which has experienced immigration only recently, this study distin-
guishes among three groups of immigrants who arrived in Spain at age 15
or younger (the “1.5 generation”) and immigrants who were older than 15
at arrival (first generation): 1) the EU and North America; 2) Maghreb; and
3) Latin America.
Our sample consists of women born between 1940 and 1989, and the
data are categorized into five ten-year birth cohorts. For two countries, in-
formation was available for a shorter cohort range: Germany 1965–1989,
and Spain 1950–1989. For Sweden only the birth cohorts 1970–1979 were
used. Sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine the effect of different
cohort ranges on the results. The analysis showed that the results changed
only slightly (the confidence intervals for the parameters were themost pre-
dominant changes); therefore, for the sake of the sample size, the full cohort
38 FERT I L I T Y BY BIRTH ORDER AMONG DESCENDANTS OF IMMIGRANTS
TABLE 1 Number of women by country
Country Number
United Kingdom 18,636
France 21,720
Germany 24,114
Belgium 42,170
Sweden 36,243
Spain 12,024
Total 154,907
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on merged data from six countries.
range (available for the most countries), that is, women born between 1940
and 1989, is used for this analysis.
We use data both from sample surveys (the UK, France, and Spain) and
from population registers (Belgium, Germany, and Sweden). The sample
size varied across countries (see Table 1). In a preliminary analysis, different
weights were applied to account for the different sample sizes. Again, the re-
sults for this sensitivity analysis did not change significantly; the most com-
mon change was an increase or decrease in confidence intervals around the
parameters when we applied sample weights (see Table A1 in Appendix).1
Because our main interest is the fertility of ethnic groups and we have in-
cluded only a few control variables, we use the original sample sizes despite
the differences across countries. Another issue was related to the compari-
son of fertility rates obtained by using register data and rates based on sur-
vey data. A previous study on the UK by Kulu and Hannemann (2016)
showed that survey data tend to overestimate fertility levels, although dif-
ferences were small. Therefore, this study may slightly underestimate fer-
tility levels in Belgium, Germany, and Sweden relative to levels in other
countries. However, this possibility is not a major concern since the main
aim is to compare fertility variation across population subgroups and iden-
tify the groups with low or high fertility levels. Given the high quality of the
data sources and use of well-defined control variables, the harmonization
of datasets from the six countries was straightforward.
Methods
We use the count-data approach to investigate fertility by parity drawing on
methodology developed by Hoem (Hoem 1987, 1993a; Hoem et al. 1976).
This approach can be used to compare fertility rates across population sub-
groups and countries with and without standardizing the rates to individ-
ual characteristics. An event-time (or occurrence-exposure) table for each
country is prepared, which is defined by a cross-classification over a set of
time intervals and covariate categories (Preston 2005). The data for each
cell in such a table include the total number of events, Ejk; the total time
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(normally person-years) at risk, Rjk; and values of covariates, xjk, for time
period j and category k. For each cell, the ratio of the number of events to
the risk-time is a crude hazard:
λ jk = Ejk
/
Rjk (1)
where λjk is the hazard for category k in time period j. Let Ejk denote the
number of first births for group k in age group j. We treat Ejk as the realiza-
tion of a Poisson random variable with the mean μjk:
μ jk = λ jk × Rjk (2)
The expected number of first births is thus the product of the hazard of first
birth and exposure time. We can present the model in a log-linear format:
lnμ jk = ln λ jk + lnRjk (3)
We then rearrange the equation to investigate the hazard of first birth:
ln
(
μ jk
/
Rjk
) = ln λ jk (4)
Finally, we present a log-linear model for the hazard of first birth while
including additional covariates:
ln λ jk = α j + xkβ (5)
where αj = ln λj measures the hazard of first birth by age (the baseline), xk
is a vector of the covariates (migrant status and country combined; cohort
and educational level), and β is a vector of the parameters to measure their
effects. For higher-order births (i.e., second and third), αj measures the haz-
ard of the nth birth by time since previous birth, and the individual’s age at
first birth can be included in the analysis as an additional covariate.
We used individual-level data to calculate exposure-occurrence tables
for each country, which were aggregated using specific combinations of
socio-demographic variables. Individuals became at risk at age 15 and were
censored at age 45 or the last data collection date, whichever came first. In
the case of Germany, the data source only allowed us to observe women
from their 18th birthday onward, and their life histories were censored at
age 40. All country files were then merged into one database and modeled
using a Poisson regressionmodel (Equation 5). The following variables were
used to prepare the exposure-occurrence tables: migrant group (specific to
country, see data section), birth cohort (1940–49, 1950–59, 1960–69, 1970–
79, 1980–89), age group (15–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–44) or years since
previous birth (0–1, 1–3, 3–5, 5–10, 10+), education level (low, medium,
and high, according to ISCED (1997) levels 0–2, 3–4, and 5–6), and, for
higher-order births, woman’s age at first birth (15–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–
44).
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Table 2 indicates the size of the population at risk and the number of
events and person-months for each birth (first, second, and third) in the six
countries by migrant group. In most cases, the population at risk decreases
when proceeding to higher-order births because women who did not expe-
rience a previous birth are no longer included in the new at-risk population
(e.g., childless women are not at risk for a second birth). For Germany, two
similar-size sample sets were drawn from the original data source for the
analysis of first and second births.
Results
First births
For the analysis of first births, all childless women are at risk. The first
model controls solely for age and birth cohort. We fit our regression mod-
els separately for two categories of countries with slightly different timing of
childbearing: early (the UK, France, and Belgium) and late (Germany, Swe-
den, Spain). Native British and German women are the reference groups in
those two categories. First birth rates are similar for native women in the
UK, France, and Belgium (Table 3 and Figure 1a). Rates are relatively low
in Germany (further analysis showed lower levels for Germany in com-
parison to the UK) and slightly higher in Spain and Sweden (Table 3 and
Figure 1b). The results are consistent with well-known differences in the
timing and level of family formation across European countries (Adsera
2011; Billari and Kohler 2004; Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene 2009;
Goldstein andKreyenfeld 2011; Kohler, Billari, andOrtega 2002; Toulemon,
Pailhé, and Rossier 2008).
Immigrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh in the UK and immigrants
from Turkey in France, Belgium, and Germany have significantly higher
first birth rates than most other population subgroups, which is expected
given that they arrived in Europe from high-fertility societies. The pat-
terns vary among the descendants of immigrants. For most ethnic minority
groups, first birth rates are similar to or slightly lower than those of natives
in the respective countries. First birth rates are somewhat higher among
women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent in the UK and for those of
Turkish origin in France and Belgium. First birth levels in Germany are also
higher among the descendants of Turkish immigrants than among natives,
but they are not particularly high in comparison with women of Turkish
origin in other European countries. In Sweden, women of Turkish descent
have first birth levels similar to those of natives. Interestingly, a number
of the second-generation groups have low first birth levels: Italians and
Moroccans in Belgium and Iranians in Sweden.
Model 2 controls for women’s education level. The differences in
first birth levels between natives, immigrants, and the descendants of
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TABLE 3 Relative risk of first birth in European countries with early and late
age at first birth
Relative risk
Early age at first birth:
UK, France, Belgium
Late age at first birth:
Germany, Sweden, Spain
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Age group
15–19 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.09*** 0.08***
20–24 0.82*** 0.79*** 0.61*** 0.59***
25–29 1 1 1 1
30–34 0.71*** 0.70*** 1.22*** 1.25***
35+ 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.60*** 0.61***
Birth cohort
1940–1949 1.35*** 1.17***
1950–1959 1.18*** 1.09*** 1.28*** 1.20***
1960–1969 1 1 1 1
1970–1979 0.92*** 1.00 0.88*** 0.91***
1980–1989 0.79*** 0.86*** 0.72*** 0.75***
United Kingdom
Native 1 1
1G Europe and West 0.72*** 0.77***
2G Europe and West 0.86*** 0.88***
1G India 1.06 1.08
2G India 0.89* 0.94
1G Pakistan and Bangladesh 1.88*** 1.58***
2G Pakistan and Bangladesh 1.30*** 1.20***
1G Caribbean 1.23** 1.15
2G Caribbean 1.02 1.02
France
Native 0.94*** 0.84***
1G Maghreb 1.03 0.81***
2G Maghreb 0.86*** 0.73***
1G Sub-Saharan Africa 1.22*** 0.99
2G Sub-Saharan Africa 0.81*** 0.75***
1G Turkey 2.03*** 1.48***
2G Turkey 1.32*** 1.06
1G Southern Europe 1.20*** 0.96*
2G Southern Europe 0.91*** 0.78***
Belgium
Native 0.92*** 0.89***
1G Italy 1.23*** 1.03*
2G Italy 0.48*** 0.44***
1G Morocco 1.21*** 0.95***
2G Morocco 0.62*** 0.52***
1G Turkey 2.11*** 1.60***
2G Turkey 1.06 0.88***
/...
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TABLE 3 (continued)
Relative risk
Early age at first birth:
UK, France, Belgium
Late age at first birth:
Germany, Sweden, Spain
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Germany
Native 1 1
1G Turkey 3.01*** 2.33***
2G Turkey 1.48*** 1.36***
Sweden
Native 1.20*** 1.23***
2G Finland 1.11*** 1.09***
2G Former Yugoslavia 1.06* 1.04
2G Turkey 1.16*** 1.12***
2G Iran 0.72*** 0.74***
Spain
Native 1.12*** 1.14***
1G EU, US, Canada 1.08** 1.10***
1.5G EU, US, Canada 0.92 0.91*
1G Maghreb 1.35*** 1.12**
1.5G Maghreb 0.99 0.84
1G Latin America 1.38*** 1.40***
1.5G Latin America 0.92 0.99
Education level
Unknown 0.97* 0.12***
Low 1 1
Medium 0.74*** 0.72***
High 0.48*** 0.52***
Constant 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.009***
***p-value < 0.01, **p < 0.05,*p < 0.1.
Model 1: controlled for birth cohort and age group. Model 2: additionally controlled for education.
SOURCE: As in Table 1.
immigrants decline but remain significant. Briefly, high fertility among
some immigrant women is only slightly explained by their lower education
levels. The effects of all of the control variables are as expected. First
birth rates are highest at ages 25–29 (early childbearing) or 30–34 (late
childbearing), they are higher among older cohorts, and they decline with
increases in women’s level of education.
Second births
Women who had a first child form the population at risk for second
births. The first model controls only for the time since first birth and birth
cohort. Again, native women in France and Belgium have similar sec-
ond birth risks, with higher levels for native British and Swedish women
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FIGURE 1a Relative risk of first birth in UK, France, and Belgium (early age at
first birth)
(Table 4 and Figure 2). Women in Germany and Spain have relatively low
second birth levels. The observed patterns are consistent with the varia-
tion in second births across European countries reported in previous stud-
ies (Goldstein and Kreyenfeld 2011; Klesment et al. 2014; Van Bavel and
Różańska-Putek 2010). Immigrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh in the
UK, immigrants from Turkey and North Africa in France, and immigrants
from Turkey andMorocco in Belgium have significantly higher second birth
rates than most of the other groups in the respective countries, suggesting
that the majority of women who become mothers have a second child.
Again, the patterns vary among the descendants of immigrants. The
descendants of immigrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh have high sec-
ond birth levels, similar to their parents (or even higher), whereas second
birth rates are somewhat lower amongwomen of Turkish and North African
origin in France and Belgium. The descendants of Turkish immigrants in
Germany and Sweden show second birth risks similar to those of natives;
in Spain, children of immigrants from the Maghreb have somewhat higher
fertility levels than natives.
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FIGURE 1b Relative risk of first birth in Germany, Sweden,
and Spain (late age at first birth)
The analysis also shows that a number of second-generation groups
have low second birth levels: Caribbeans in the UK, Southern Europeans in
Belgium and France, and Europeans and Latin Americans in Spain. Model
2 additionally controls for women’s age at first birth and their education
level. Interestingly, for some groups, the fertility differences relative to na-
tive British women slightly decline, while for others they slightly increase,
although the changes are not large. Further analysis showed that some un-
expected changes are related to the inclusion of education in the analysis.
Second birth rates are the highest (rather than the lowest) among highly
educated women showing shorter birth intervals (rather than higher par-
ity progression levels) among the majority population of the respective
countries.
Third births
For third births, samples were large enough for all minority groups in the
UK, France, Belgium, and Sweden. Third birth levels are relatively simi-
lar for natives in the UK, France, and Belgium and are somewhat lower
in Sweden (Table 5 and Figure 3). A number of immigrant groups have
very high third birth risks: women from Pakistan and Bangladesh in the
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TABLE 4 Relative risk of second birth in six European countries
Relative risk
Model 1 Model 2
Years since first birth
0–1 0.40*** 0.40***
1–3 1 1
3–5 0.85*** 0.85***
5–10 0.38*** 0.38***
10+ 0.08*** 0.08***
Birth cohort
1940–1949 1.16*** 1.12***
1950–1959 1.06*** 1.04***
1960–1969 1 1
1970–1979 1.02** 0.98**
1980–1989 0.92*** 0.81***
United Kingdom
Native 1 1
1G Europe and West 0.96 0.94
2G Europe and West 0.89** 0.89**
1G India 1.04 1.00
2G India 1.16* 1.15*
1G Pakistan and Bangladesh 1.53*** 1.50***
2G Pakistan and Bangladesh 1.83*** 1.79***
1G Caribbean 0.65*** 0.63***
2G Caribbean 0.60*** 0.56***
France
Native 0.77*** 0.77***
1G Maghreb 1.22*** 1.29***
2G Maghreb 0.88*** 0.90***
1G Sub-Saharan Africa 0.89*** 0.88***
2G Sub-Saharan Africa 0.76*** 0.76***
1G Turkey 1.46*** 1.42***
2G Turkey 1.04 1.06
1G Southern Europe 0.73*** 0.73***
2G Southern Europe 0.67*** 0.68***
Germany
Native 0.62*** 0.65***
1G Turkey 0.93** 0.93**
2G Turkey 0.60*** 0.61***
Belgium
Native 0.69*** 0.67***
1G Italy 0.77*** 0.74***
2G Italy 0.61*** 0.60***
1G Morocco 1.48*** 1.34***
2G Morocco 0.92 0.88**
1G Turkey 1.45*** 1.26***
2G Turkey 0.78*** 0.72***
/...
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TABLE 4 (continued)
Relative risk
Model 1 Model 2
Sweden
Native 0.93*** 1.00
2G Finland 0.82*** 0.88***
2G Former Yugoslavia 0.79*** 0.85***
2G Turkey 0.82*** 0.85***
2G Iran 0.89 1.00
Spain
Native 0.52*** 0.54***
1G EU, US, Canada 0.41*** 0.42***
1.5G EU, US, Canada 0.45*** 0.48***
1G Maghreb 0.64*** 0.68***
1.5G Maghreb 0.67*** 0.71***
1G Latin America 0.45*** 0.44***
1.5G Latin America 0.45*** 0.46***
Education level
Unknown 1.23***
Low 1
Medium 0.98**
High 1.21***
Age at first birth
15–19 1.11***
20–24 1
25–29 0.89***
30+ 0.66***
Constant 0.027*** 0.028***
Significance level: ***p-value < 0.01, **p < 0.05,* p < 0.1.
Model 1: controlled for birth cohort and time since first birth. Model 2: additionally controlled for education and
age at first birth.
SOURCE: As in Table 1.
UK, immigrants from Turkey and North and sub-Saharan Africa in France,
and immigrants from Turkey and Morocco in Belgium. Fertility rates are
also slightly higher than native rates in the UK among immigrants from In-
dia and the Caribbean. Interestingly, most descendants of immigrants also
show relatively high levels. Third birth rates are high among women of
Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent in the UK and also among women of
Indian and Caribbean origin. Similarly, elevated third birth rates are ob-
served among the descendants of immigrants from both African regions in
France and from Morocco in Belgium and those of Turkish descent in both
countries. In contrast, third birth rates are low for Southern Europeans in
France and Belgium. In Sweden, most ethnic minorities have fertility lev-
els similar to natives, except those of Turkish origin whose third birth rates
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TABLE 5 Relative risk of third birth in four European countries
Relative risk
Model 1 Model 2
Years since second birth
0–1 0.66*** 0.65***
1–3 1 1
3–5 0.79*** 0.79***
5–10 0.37*** 0.36***
10+ 0.08*** 0.07***
Birth cohort
1940–1949 1.29*** 1.13***
1950–1959 1.07*** 0.98
1960–1969 1 1
1970–1979 1.08*** 0.99
1980–1989 1.27*** 1.00
United Kingdom
Native 1 1
1G Europe and West 0.89 0.92
2G Europe and West 1.25*** 1.25***
1G India 1.29*** 1.26**
2G India 1.66*** 1.73***
1G Pakistan and Bangladesh 3.12*** 2.78***
2G Pakistan and Bangladesh 2.45*** 2.29***
1G Caribbean 1.42** 1.23
2G Caribbean 1.62*** 1.39***
France
Native 0.96 0.92*
1G Maghreb 2.74*** 2.63***
2G Maghreb 1.68*** 1.61***
1G Sub-Saharan Africa 2.58*** 2.27***
2G Sub-Saharan Africa 2.00*** 1.86***
1G Turkey 2.86*** 2.28***
2G Turkey 1.48*** 1.36**
1G Southern Europe 0.85*** 0.74***
2G Southern Europe 0.65*** 0.62***
Belgium
Native 0.90*** 0.83***
1G Italy 1.12*** 0.89***
2G Italy 0.79** 0.75***
1G Morocco 3.97*** 2.77***
2G Morocco 1.89*** 1.63***
1G Turkey 3.10*** 2.02***
2G Turkey 1.41** 1.09
/...
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TABLE 5 (continued)
Relative risk
Model 1 Model 2
Sweden
Native 0.72*** 0.88***
2G Finland 0.73*** 0.84***
2G Former Yugoslavia 0.58*** 0.68***
2G Turkey 1.12* 1.15**
2G Iran 0.78 1.01
Education level
Unknown 1.40***
Low 1
Medium 0.83***
High 0.91***
Age at first birth
15–19 1.35***
20–24 1
25–29 0.69***
30+ 0.48***
Constant 0.007*** 0.009***
Significance level: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,* p < 0.1.
Model 1: controlled for birth cohort and time since second birth. Model 2: additionally controlled for education
and age at first birth.
SOURCE: As in Table 1.
are higher than those of native women. Model 2 additionally controls for
women’s education level and age at first birth. The fertility differences be-
tween ethnic groups decline slightly, but the main differences persist. The
effects of the covariates are largely as expected. Third birth rates are highest
one to three years after the birth of the second child, and they are higher
for the oldest cohorts. The rates also decline with increases in women’s age
at first birth; the rates are higher among women with the lowest education
levels.
Summary and discussion
This study investigated fertility among the descendants of immigrants in six
European countries, with a focus on ethnic minority women whose parents
arrived in Europe from high-fertility countries. We can summarize the re-
sults as follows. First, many of the descendants of immigrants had levels that
were similar to those of the native population in their respective countries;
however, first birth levels were slightly higher among women of Pakistani
and Bangladeshi origin in the UK and for those of Turkish descent in France
and Belgium, which mostly suggests earlier childbearing among these eth-
nic groups. Second, progression rates to a second child varied less among the
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descendants of immigrants; only women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ori-
gin in the UK exhibited elevated second birth levels. Third, most ethnic mi-
nority women in the UK, France, and Belgium showed significantly higher
third birth levels than natives in those countries. Fourth, the inclusion of
women’s education changed the results slightly, but the main differences
across the ethnic groups persisted. Finally, fertility variation across ethnic
groups was the largest in France, the UK, and Belgium and the smallest in
Sweden.
The descendants of immigrants can be distinguished according to their
fertility patterns. Women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin in the UK
showed consistently high fertility levels: their first birth rates were some-
what higher than those of native women, and their second and third birth
levels were significantly higher. Similarly, women of Turkish descent in
France, Belgium, and Sweden had slightly higher first birth rates; their
second and third birth levels were somewhat lower, although still higher
than those of native women in each country. Indians in the UK and North
Africans in France had first and second birth rates that were similar to those
of natives, while third birth rates were significantly higher. Caribbeans in
the UK and sub-Saharan Africans in France had first birth levels that were
similar to those of natives, lower second birth rates, and relatively high third
birth levels, suggesting a polarization among women of these groups by fer-
tility behavior. Finally, Europeans and Latin Americans had fertility patterns
broadly similar to those of natives, although Southern Europeans had rela-
tively low rates of first and third births.2
The analysis supported the idea that both the mainstream society and
the minority subculture have shaped the childbearing patterns of the de-
scendants of immigrants in Europe. Overall, the descendants of immigrants
from high-fertility countries had lower parity-specific fertility than did their
parents’ generation. Furthermore, in Sweden and Germany, the second
generation exhibited fertility levels that were very similar to or even lower
than those of natives. However, we also observed relatively high first birth
rates for some and high third birth rates for many ethnic minority women,
which suggest that factors specific to ethnic minorities have also shaped
fertility patterns. While we expected that education would explain a larger
share of the high fertility among ethnic minority women, this was not the
case. The inclusion of women’s education level in the models only slightly
reduced the fertility differences between ethnic groups. It is possible that
factors directly related to employment played a key role; however, previ-
ous research suggests that the inclusion of employment status in the mod-
els would not change the patterns significantly (Bernhardt 1993; Hamel
and Pailhé 2015). A number of cultural factors may further explain fertility
variations across ethnic groups and the high fertility levels among some
ethnic minority women. Elsewhere we have shown that ethnic minority
women with high fertility levels come from large families and are more
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religious than natives (Kulu et al. 2015). Previous research demonstrates
that individuals who come from larger families are more likely to have
larger families themselves, and those who are more religious have higher
fertility levels, particularly higher third birth rates (Michael and Tuma 1985;
Philipov and Berghammer 2007).
Our analysis also supported the idea that the European country
context influences both overall fertility levels and differences between
population subgroups. First birth rates were relatively low for all ethnic
minority groups in Germany and Spain, suggesting later family forma-
tion and/or a lower likelihood of becoming a mother in those countries—a
well-known finding from previous studies. Fertility variation across eth-
nic groups was the smallest in Sweden and the largest in France, the UK,
and Belgium. The finding related to Sweden is not surprising. Research has
shown that the generous and universal Nordic welfare system has an equal-
izing effect on all population subgroups; ethnic minorities are relatively well
integrated into education and the labor market in those countries, and lev-
els of residential segregation are relatively low (Bevelander 2004). Welfare
state policies have likely reduced differences between population subgroups
in the UK and France; however, the size of the mainminority groups is large
in those countries and residential and school segregation is high, particu-
larly in the UK (Musterd 2005; Pan Ke Shon and Verdugo 2015). These
factors certainly promote minority subcultures in those countries and re-
inforce specific family patterns—for instance, through high levels of ethnic
intermarriages. Examples are Turkish immigrants and their descendants in
France and Belgium, and South Asians in the UK. Those examples under-
line the importance of country context and illustrate that immigrant fertil-
ity behavior can be strongly influenced by the mainstream society and local
fertility patterns.
This is the first study to investigate parity-specific fertility rates among
the descendants of immigrants in Europe from a comparative perspective.
We showed that fertility levels are lower among the descendants of immi-
grants (second generation) than among the first generation. Fertility among
the second generation is often similar to that of the native population, al-
though third birth rates in particular remain relatively high among certain
ethnic minority groups. Overall, fertility levels of the descendants of immi-
grants from high-fertility countries fall in between levels of immigrants and
the native population. However, we also found some polarization among
the descendants of immigrants from high-fertility countries: a significant
minority have their first child as late as native women or even remain
childless, while the majority have relatively large families (three or four
children, as was the case for their parents’ generation). Such polarization
also characterizes groups with lower fertility levels—for example, descen-
dants of Indians and Caribbeans in the UK or descendants of North and sub-
Saharan Africans in France. Some of these descendants of immigrants have
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small families, while others have large families. Educational differences ex-
plain some fertility variation across population subgroups, but significant
variations persist. Previous research showed that factors related to family
of origin (e.g. number of siblings, religiosity) correlate with the presence of
large families among some ethnic minority groups. Intra-group marriages
also dominate among high-fertility populations, although the direction of
causality between marital patterns and fertility is not clear.
Fertility levels of the descendants of immigrants from high-fertility
countries are likely to decline further in the third generation due to the
changes in their families of origin. Fewer members of the third generation
will come from large families, and the strength of their religiosity is ex-
pected to decline. This could be considered as a sign of intergenerational
assimilation of fertility (Coleman and Dubuc 2010; Dubuc 2012), which
for some minority groups in Europe will occur more slowly than perhaps
expected. However, we will simultaneously expect to see increasing het-
erogeneity among ethnic minority populations. While a significant number
of members of those populations will exhibit childbearing patterns similar
to those of the majority population, there will still be a significant group
of those with large families, with three to four children. European societies
should see large ethnic minority families as an asset for low-fertility soci-
eties and ensure that children from such families have the same educational
and employment opportunities as those from families with only one or two
children.
Our findings of depressed fertility among some groups of the descen-
dants of immigrants are also noteworthy. Some immigrant descendants in
Europe showed even lower fertility than that of the native population (e.g.,
Southern Europeans in Western Europe and Iranians in Sweden). On the
one hand, the patterns may be related to those of their parents’ country
of origin (e.g., for Southern Europeans). On the other hand, they may also
reflect unrealized fertility intentions—for example, if young adults frommi-
nority families face difficulties when seeking to establish themselves and to
start a family. Policymakers need to be sensitive to the needs of minority
youth, for instance by providing more active educational counseling and
addressing cases of discrimination in the labor market.
We believe that the diversity of childbearing patterns in Europe is
here to stay and that immigrants and their descendants are overrepresented
in non-standard family forms. In addition, we should not expect rapid
changes in childbearing patterns among immigrants and their descendants;
while some changes may occur quickly, others may take place over several
generations, particularly if patterns reflect cultural preferences and mi-
nority identities. Historical research has shown that diversity in family
forms, if appropriately supported, can co-exist with successful labor mar-
ket and social integration of migrant minorities and native majorities
alike.
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1 Table A1 is available at the supporting
information tab at wileyonlinelibrary.com/
journal/pdr.
2 We conducted a series of analyses to
determine how sensitive the results of a
comparative study of six countries are to dif-
ferent sample selections and model specifi-
cations. Overall, the results on second and
third birth rates were robust to different
sample selections and model specifications.
However, there was some variation across
first birth models for some ethnic groups.
The estimated first birth rates for women
of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent in the
UK and women of Turkish and Northern
African origin in France and Belgium var-
ied across models. For example, first birth
levels for the descendants of Pakistani and
Bangladeshi immigrants were only slightly
higher than those of British native women
when we used only the sample of the
British and French women; the differences
increased when we included all other coun-
tries in the analysis. The estimates also var-
ied for women of Moroccan descent in
Belgium.
The reason for such a variation is that
the timing of family formation seems to
vary significantly across countries and eth-
nic groups (which is an interesting finding
per se), and it is therefore not easy to find a
common baseline (i.e., the shape of the age-
specific first birth rates) for all groups and
countries. An obvious solution would be to
allow different baselines for different groups
or to estimate separate models for different
age groups (e.g., 15–29 versus 30–44). How-
ever, our further analysis showed that these
strategies may not work well either. The sec-
ond generation mostly comes from younger
cohorts, and there are only a few among
them who have reached older (childbearing)
ages; this figure also varies across groups.
To address the issue of timing of family for-
mation, we decided to fit first birth mod-
els separately for two groups of countries,
those with earlier family formation (the UK,
France, and Belgium) and those with later
(Germany, Sweden, and Spain). Our sensi-
tivity analysis therefore suggests that the el-
evated first birth levels for some groups and
low first birth rates for others should be in-
terpreted with caution. However, the esti-
mated second and third birth rates are ro-
bust to different sample selections and model
specifications.
Another issue is related to immigrant
fertility. Given the tendency for the migrant
population to have a child shortly after ar-
rival in the country, period measures of fer-
tility often overestimate migrant total fertil-
ity (Parrado 2011; Persson and Hoem 2014;
Robards and Berrington 2015). Because this
study uses full fertility histories for immi-
grants and controls for age and birth co-
hort, such bias should be reduced to a min-
imum, although the use of pre-migration
fertility for immigrants can be challenged
from methodological and substantive point
of views (Hoem 2014).
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